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In the period from 1971-1989 there was a Golden Age when the basic relationship between the three countries 
was positive. The era began when a small group of Chinese and U.S. leaders, relatively insulated from public 
pressures, determined that it was in their strategic geopolitical interest to work together. China wanted relations with 
the West to counter potential threats from the Soviet Union, and the United States wanted to end the war in Vietnam 
and to strengthen the coalition against the Soviet Union. Japan quickly upgraded relations with China to ensure that 
its businesses had an opportunity in the Chinese market. By the end of the period, economic relations and personal 
relations between China and the other two countries had greatly increased. The growth of contacts reduced the 
capacity of a small group of leaders to make decisions on behalf of their countries for they were no longer insulated 
from public pressures. 
The end of the Cold War destroyed the strategic basis for cooperation against the Soviet Union, and the June 4, 
1989 Incident brought on several years of sanctions of Western countries against China. Contacts between U.S. and 
Chinese leaders fell off immediately but those between China and Japan remained relatively positive until after 
1992. By that time Chinese concerns about the Japanese decision to send military to take part in peacekeeping 
operations and to extend its defense perimeter to include sea lanes created Chinese worries about possible 
remilitarization. Continued Chinese criticisms of Japanese attitudes toward World War II began to cause negative 
Japanese reactions, especially among Japanese who were born after World War II. While Chinese and Japanese have 
effective work relationship in many areas, these relations remain fragile because they are subject to strong 
nationalistic moods in both countries related to issues concerned particularly with World War II and the rise of 
China. 
The future peace and stability of the region requires that the three countries work together to deal with common 
issues. All three countries have interests that require them to work together and to deal with common issues.The 
three biggest issues that must be dealt with are: (1) methods for resolving the North Korean issue,  (2) ways to avoid 
misunderstandings about Taiwan, and (3) ways to promote a forthright open discussion between Japanese and 
Chinese about what happened in World War II. 
In the 140 years since the rise of Japan in the late 19th century, four major powers have been dominant in East 
Asia—China, Japan, the United States, and Russia. A fifth power, Korea, was colonized in 1910 and divided after 
World War II, but the southern half emerged as a middle-sized power in the 1970s as a result of its political 
independence and economic growth. Even if the South and North were reunited, Korea would likely remain a 
middle-sized power. The Soviet Union emerged as a major global power after World War II, but with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the primary orientation of Russia to Europe, and the slow growth of its economy in an era when 
the economy is a key measure of a nation’s power, it no longer ranks with Japan, China, and the United States as a 
major power in East Asia.  
Since China emerged as a major economic power at the end of the 20th century, there is a new situation where 
for the first time Japan, China, and the United States are all strong powers in East Asia, and prospects are that this 
will continue for at least the next several decades. The future of peace and prosperity in East Asia rests heavily on 
the relationship of these three major powers—the United States, China, and Japan. This paper reviews the relations 
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Ezra F. Vogel / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7572–7575 7573
between these three powers since World War II and concludes with an examination of their relationships at the 
beginning of the 21st century. 
Triangular Relations Since World War II 
With the emergence of the Cold War in the late 1940s, China became allied with the Soviet Union and Japan with 
the United States. As a result, U.S. relations with Japan blossomed while U.S. relations with China were almost non-
existent. After 1949, Japanese leaders sought to continue the post-colonial economic relationship with China that 
had begun to blossom after 1945. However, with the Allied Occupation of Japan that continued until 1952, Japan 
had little choice but to follow the U.S. lead in virtually cutting off economic relations with China. Even after the 
Occupation Japan’s dependence on the United States for its trade, security, and participation in the international 
political arena caused it to limit its contacts with China. 
As a result of their historical experiences, the Chinese and American people came to have very different 
perspectives on Japan. The Chinese had their closest first-hand experience with the Japanese in World War II when 
the Japanese military invaded and occupied most of their country. The instinctive reaction of Chinese people toward 
the cruelties of Japanese soldiers, the sense of humiliation toward conquerors from a small island nation, and the 
publicity given these cruelties by Chinese leaders, aware that anti-Japanese sentiment could strengthen national 
unity, helped solidify deep anti-Japanese emotions in the Chinese people. Although Americans were infuriated at the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and for four years regarded Japan as a major enemy, few Americans had personal 
contact with Japanese during World War II. American impressions of Japan were shaped by their personal contact 
with Japanese after World War II when it was obvious that the Japanese people had developed a deep revulsion to 
militarism, a respect for democracy and Western values, a desire to study Western technology, business, and way of 
life, and a readiness to be reliable allies of the West.  
The Golden Era, 1969-1989 
The Sino-Soviet tensions that began to build in the 1960s and culminated in border clashes in 1969 gave rise to a 
special period when all three nations, China, Japan, and the United States, had relatively good relationships with 
each other. The strategic basis for this new era was China’s growing clash with the Soviet Union and the U.S. desire 
to extricate itself from Vietnam and broaden the anti-Soviet alliance. Chinese strategists have often begun their 
analysis with the designation of the main enemy, and then gone on to consider which powers might unite with them 
against their main enemy. In World War II, Chinese Communist strategists considered Japan as the main enemy and 
therefore developed a united front policy against the Guomindang. From 1945 to 1949, they considered the 
Guomindang as the main enemy and looked to the Soviet Union to help them against the Guomindang. After they 
pushed the Guomindang off the mainland in 1949, they considered the United States as the main enemy and 
cultivated their alliance with the Soviet Union. But in the 1960s as they began to perceive the Soviet Union as their 
main enemy, they were prepared to seek closer relations with Western countries. The United States, eager to put 
pressure on the Soviet Union and to resolve the Vietnam War, was ready to cooperate with China.  
For the first decade after 1971, economic relations and personal contacts between people on both sides were on a 
small scale. Nonetheless the opening of contacts between the two nations, widely known in each country through the 
media, began to have an impact on public attitudes. Chinese were eager to study science, technology and 
management skills from the United States, and some Chinese youth who began to negate everything connected with 
the Cultural Revolution, including anti-foreignism, began to long for an American style of life. The American 
public, acting as if the China that had been “lost” in 1949 was found, began to revive their interest in Chinese 
culture and the Chinese people while the U.S. business community sensed new opportunities in the China market. 
In 1971 when the United States reopened high level relations with China, Japanese businessmen who since 1949 
had unsuccessfully sought ways to enter the China market were pleased to have a new opportunity. After the 1971 
“Nixon shocks,” when the United States, without prior consultation, reopened the door to China and inaugurated 
floating exchange rates, Japanese business leaders worried that the United States might be aiming to get a foothold 
in the Chinese market before the Japanese. Japanese political leaders, very pro-business, were eager to ensure that 
Japanese business people had the same opportunities in the Chinese market as the Americans. Unlike U.S. leaders, 
Japanese leaders were not constrained by domestic political pressures and other priority foreign policy issues to go 
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slow in improving political relations with China. They moved immediately, and in 1972 Japan and China 
established diplomatic relations with China. 
This golden era in which the governments of all three countries in this triangle, —China, Japan and the United 
States—had basically positive relationships with each, continued until 1989. In the early 1970s when there were few 
public pressures that affected political relationships with China, a small group of strategists in the highest levels of 
government both in Japan and the United States were free to shape policy toward China. However, as economic 
relations and personal contacts began to blossom and as the representatives from Taiwan began to expand their 
lobbying in Tokyo as well as Washington, broader groups of citizens in Japan and the United States began to take a 
greater interest in political issues affecting the relationship between their countries. 
Current relationships 
Sino-Japanese relations. By the early years of the 21st century, Japan’s trade with China is beginning to surpass 
its trade with the United States, and this trend is likely to grow. Personal travel between China and Japan exceeds 
that between Japan and the United States and is likely to continue to grow at a rapid rate. Although Chinese 
intellectual exchange with Japan is far less than with the United States, it is also growing. At the grass-roots level, 
Japanese and Chinese have learned to deal with each other. Japanese businesses help provide scholarships to 
Chinese students in Japan, then hire them after graduation, let them serve in the Japanese home office or factory for 
a few years, and then send them to work in their office in China. Back in China these Japanese-speaking Chinese 
working for Japanese companies serve as effective go-betweens. Labor intensive Japanese industries continue to 
move to China at a rapid rate, helping industry within China to raise its technological and managerial skills. 
Japanese companies in China export not only to Japan, but to the entire world, thus helping China gain foreign 
currency. And Japanese exports to China, including not only high quality products but high technology components 
for goods produced in China and sold in China and elsewhere are growing rapidly. At a personal level, when 
individual Chinese and Japanese meet they are rarely effusive, but they are generally polite. Government officials in 
the two countries have a professional and sometimes even pleasant relationship that enables them to deal with issues 
on a pragmatic basis. This is particularly true in certain communities like Dalian, where local officials want to 
maintain good relations with Japanese businesses that provide investment of great benefit to their community. 
But these good working relationships are ultimately fragile. In the current mood, if in China publicity about an 
incident involving Japanese people in China or about a Japanese politician’s statements in Japan could easily lead to 
an explosion of popular sentiment in both countries that could complicate the carefully cultivated good working 
relationships between Japanese and Chinese at various levels. The topic which has become the lightning rod for 
emotions in both countries is the historical issue of what happened in World War II. But fueling these sentiments are 
deep underlying concerns about the future in both countries. Many Japanese businesses fear further economic 
challenges as China moves increasingly to high technology and heavy industry and acquire Japanese technology. 
Japanese are concerned about the long-range impact of anti-Japanese sentiments in China as China becomes 
increasingly active and powerful on the world stage. Japanese worry that as China builds a greater military capacity 
in the future, it might be tempted to use or threaten to use that capacity when Chinese and Japanese interests diverge. 
Chinese in turn fear what Japan, with a very large defense budget and technological capacities still beyond their 
reach, might do as its military takes a larger international role. 
U.S.-Japanese relations. By now, Japanese and U.S. citizens have deep relationships in all sectors that have 
grown over half a century from extensive contacts based on a sharing of mutual values, comparable levels of 
economic development, cooperation on international issues including security, and deep relations of trust. These 
close contacts in all fields of activity have enabled Japanese and U.S. counterparts in various sectors to develop an 
excellent understanding. The U.S. fear of economic challenge from Japan peaked in the late 1980s and faded with 
Japanese economic stagnation and U.S. economic growth in the 1990s. People in the two countries feel comfortable 
with each other. The national governments in the two countries do differ on specific issues, but the two countries 
have a strong basis for continued cooperation on global as well as regional issues. 
U.S.-China relations. In the decade after the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, U.S.-China relations were quite tense. 
But as the Chinese economy grew and the new generation of China’s well-educated cosmopolitan officials and 
scholars reached maturity, Chinese participation in international activities, multilateral and bilateral, has increased 
and become nuanced and sophisticated. China had changed from a nation that in the 1960s was encouraging 
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revolution against world powers to a nation with deep and acknowledged interest in the world system as it exists and 
a readiness to cooperate in constructive resolution of global issues. From a nation that was concerned almost 
exclusively with how the global system affected China, Chinese leaders are increasingly thinking about what kind of 
activities are needed throughout the world to maintain a world system that benefits all countries. This is a natural 
evolution that began with Deng Xiaoping’s recognition in the late 1970s that China’s greatest priority for the 
coming decades is development and that to achieve this it needs peaceful relations with other countries. The U.S. 
willingness to cooperate with China in dealing with a host of global issues was apparent even before China joined 
the World Trade Organization and long before 911, but the entry into WTO and the common interest in combating 
terrorism has strengthened their basis for cooperation after 911.  
Since the United States insists that the Taiwan Straits issue should be resolved peacefully and is still selling 
weapons to Taiwan, there is a significant risk of clash between China and the United States over Taiwan. The 
military in any country must consider contingencies that it might face in the future. Chinese military planners must 
consider what they might do if Taiwanese leaders continue the path toward independence. And Pentagon officials 
considering future security risks must consider how to respond to potential challenges from a country with a 
substantial economic base that is rapidly upgrading its military capacities. No country fits the description better than 
China. But preparations for contingencies ordinarily do not lead to conflict. At the very top level of the U.S. and 
Chinese governments, these concerns are now subordinated to the overall willingness to cooperate with each other 
on issues of common concern.  
Despite tensions and the risk of conflict over Taiwan and other issues, at least for the moment, the strains in U.S.-
China relations are under control in each country, managed by high officials who acknowledge the need for 
cooperation and are finding modalities to achieve it. Both countries now have a significant group of people outside 
of official office who are familiar with the basic issues in the relationship between the two countries. 
The Complex Triangle 
How can these three great powers of Asia manage their relationship? Japan, with enormous economic relations 
both with China and the United States, does not want to have to choose sides between the other two powers. At the 
same time militarily it sees the risk of a potential threat from the United States as almost non-existent whereas it is 
less certain how China will act when it becomes strong militarily. If Japan were to become independent militarily 
not only would this greatly increase the necessary expenditures but it would also increase the tensions with China. 
For this reason, Japan is likely to keep a strong military relationship with the United States while finding a degree of 
independence to reduce the risk of becoming dragged into actions it considers not in keeping with its interests. 
China remains concerned about protecting what it sees as its key interests, particularly preventing Taiwan 
independence. The United States must manage an alliance with Japan while it remains a friend of China. These 
relationships are more difficult to manage by a small group of leaders since the publics in all three countries are so 
deeply involved in key issues. The challenge in the decades ahead will be to orchestrate complex domestic political 
considerations in all three countries with the obvious interests all three have in common in preserving stability in the 
region. 
At this time, there are three main issues which the three countries need to address. One is the North Korean issue. 
Here the issue is of ensuring that North Korea undertake in a staged fashion the complete verifiable irreversible 
dismantling of its nuclear weapons facilities. In exchange other countries can gradually reduce sanctions, allow 
investment to flow, and begin to move toward formal diplomatic relations between North Korea and both Japan and 
the United States. In dealing with Taiwan, the issue between these three countries is for the U.S. and China to avoid 
misunderstandings that might lead to conflict. The third issue is the historical issue between China and Japan. 
Formal apologies are no longer useful. What is needed are open discussions of what actually happened and the 
establishment of joint Sino-Japanese groups working toward the development of common textbooks. 
 
 
